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Abstract      
This paper is concerned about the performance evaluation aspect of performance contracting (PC), particularly, 
the performance dimensions used in performance contract system for evaluating the performance of State-
Owned Enterprises (SOEs). The paper draws on evidence from the Ghanaian and Kenyan SOE sectors. The 
performance indicators under each broad performance dimension of the performance contract system were 
reviewed. This was achieved using data collected from multiple secondary sources including policy documents, 
government reports and publications. The findings of the paper revealed a number of insights into the evaluation 
of performance contracting as a tool for evaluating SOEs. 
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1.0 Introduction 
The system of performance contracting dates back to the 1960s, but was introduced as part of the sponsored 
reform experimentations by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in the 1980s to 
governments in developing countries (Islam, 1993; Mallon, 1994; Nellis, 1988; Shirley and Nellis, 1991; World 
Bank, 1995). Though the system is concerned with relationship based on mutually agreed responsibilities and 
obligations between two parties; namely, government at one hand and SOEs on the other, the system also has 
several objectives including accountability, corporate planning, performance monitoring and evaluation, and 
improved performance in any respect (Islam, 1993; Trivedi, 2008; Shirley, 1989; Shirley and Xu, 1998, 2001).  
Over the years, there have been studies examining the nature of the system, the sets of activities that the 
system entails, and the impact of the system on the SOEs practices and performance (e.g. Larbi, 2001; Shirley & 
Xu, 1998, 2001; Simpson & Onumah, 2010). However, studies examining the impact of the system on the 
performance of SOEs seem- to have dominated the literature despite the mixed results (Larbi, 2001; Shirley & 
Xu, 1998, 2001). This study argues that the mixed results on the impact of the system can be explained by the 
nature of the performance evaluation aspect of the PC system. Indeed for studies with positive results, scholars 
argue that the targets negotiated are easy (soft), resulting in what is known as “ratchet effect” (Weitzman, 1980). 
Specifically, the targets are said to be weak, manipulated and distorted arising from SOE managers’ information 
advantage (see e.g. Larbi, 2001; Shirley & Xu, 1998, 2001). However, these assertions are not supported with 
any empirics (Shirley & Xu, 1998).   
The foregoing makes the performance evaluation aspect of the performance contracting system an area 
of interest. Moreover, the issues that may be of interest are the institutional arrangements for performance 
evaluation, the processes of performance evaluation, and the performance evaluation indicators. The purpose of 
this study is to focus only the performance dimensions used in the PC system for evaluating the performance 
SOEs. 
To achieve the objective of this paper, evidence is gathered from two countries which adopted and 
implemented the PC system under different circumstance and at different time periods: Ghana and Kenya. For 
instance, Ghana was the first Anglophone nation to adopt the performance contracting system in Africa and the 
operation of the system has overtime undergone a myriad of changes. On the other hand, Kenya implemented 
performance contract in her SOEs sector in 2004 and by 2007, the operation of the system has earned the country 
a place among the top 20 countries in the world per the United Nation’s award for excellence in public service 
and public sector reform introduced in 2003. In fact, the performance contracting system of Kenya won the first 
position in the category of accountability, transparency and responsiveness in delivering public service 
(Government of Kenya, 2010). 
In light of the above, evidence from the two countries does not only provide useful lessons to other 
developing countries, but also engender debate on whether the length of experimenting the performance contract 
system affects its operation. The rest of the paper is organized as follow. The next section provides an overview 
of the literature in relation to the purpose of this study. This is followed with the research method adopted for the 
study, including an overview of the research settings. The next section presents results in relation to the two 
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cases, and the penultimate section discusses the results from the cross-case analysis. Conclusions are presented 
in the final section. 
 
2.0 Overview of the literature 
Performance contracting can be traced to the French who invented what they referred to as contract program in 
the 1960s and has evolved to be known as contract plan (Islam, 1993; Shirley, 1989; Nellis, 1988). Nellis (1988) 
explained that, the invention was spurred by reports of poor financial performance of SOEs which dominated the 
French economy following her reaction to the World wars (I and II) and policy of nationalisations. He added that, 
based on the diagnosis of the problem of poor performance, contracting was designed to clarify goal and 
objectives of SOEs, set targets on inputs and outputs, subventions, wage bills, pricing and tariffs, etc., so as to 
ensure a balanced autonomy between government who are owners of the SOEs and the managers/board of 
directors of SOEs.  
By nature, contract plan comprises an arrangements where two parties, namely, the owner of a SOE 
enterprises represented by government and the SOE represented by its board/management, mutually agree on 
some obligations and responsibilities (Nellis, 1989), hence the term contract. Generally, the contract outlines of 
rights, obligations and responsibilities of both parties, but from the above studies, the contract period historically 
spanned for 5 years. The duration of the contract from the late 1970s to early 1980s was reduced to 3 and 2 years 
with provisions that allow annual reviews and revisions to reflect actual and potential changes that affect the 
operation of the SOEs. Moreover, the plans were restructured to promote transparency with respect to the 
financial obligations of parties to the contract, publication of SOE performance, and investment decisions.  
The foregoing changes have over the years been consolidated into four broad objectives identified with 
the contract plan (Nellis, 1988, p, 19): 
• To assure coordination between the medium term objectives of the enterprise and the policy of the State; 
• To associate the enterprise in the realization of objectives of national interest; 
• To mobilize the personnel of the enterprise to support the defined objectives; 
• To allow autonomy of management; and 
• To define and specify the financial relations of the enterprise and the State. 
Based on some recorded success stories, the French extended the principles of the contract plan to her colonies 
(e.g. Tunisia, Senegal, and Morocco), and others developing countries also imported the system relying on the 
general underpinnings to develop  their own and as part of the World Bank sponsored reform programmes under 
various tags (Nellis, 1988). The most common include India’s memorandum of understanding (MOU), Korea’s 
performance evaluation and monitoring systems, Pakistanis’ signalling system, and Philippines’ performance 
monitoring and evaluation system, performance agreement, results framework, performance contract, and many 
more (Islam, 1993, Trivedi, 2005; Shirley, 1989; Shirley & Xu, 1998).  
The afore-mentioned versions of performance contracting highlights the inappropriateness of the term 
contract since that suggests that the content are enforceable at the law court. In practice, contract plans are 
unenforceable in the judicial system (see e.g. Nillis, 1988). Furthermore, performance evaluation is emphasized 
in later versions of post France’s contract plan. In the signalling system for instance, the objectives are to ensure 
performance evaluation system that promoted socially desirable performance; create Performance Information 
System for reliable measure of public enterprise economic performance; and provide an incentive/rewarding 
system for management and staff of public enterprises if targets are met. Similarly in India’s MOU, performance 
evaluation is rooted in that mechanism to compel improvement of performance management (Trivedi, 2005).  
With regards to World Bank sponsored performance contracts also, Shirley and Nellis (1991) note that 
the objectives include setting explicit and realistic objectives consistent with commercial operations, allowing 
greater managerial autonomy in all areas of decision making (operations, engaging managers), clarifying and 
streamlining the extent of government involvement in SOE decision making, holding managers accountable by 
negotiating targets, monitoring and evaluating results, and rewarding managers and staff on the basis of 
performance.  
In all of the above, performance monitoring and evaluation is considered critical because it involves 
assessing the extent to which mutually agreed objectives and targets are achieved, and also informs the quantum 
of incentive to be offered (Islam, 1993; Shirley, 1989; Shirley & Xu, 1998, 2001; Nellis, 1988, 1989; Trivedi, 
2005). However, studies on the performance evaluation aspect of performance contracting relative to the other 
elements have minimal attention. Indeed, although many of the studies on performance contracting highlight the 
performance monitoring and evaluation aspect of performance contract, there is little evidence in the literature 
focusing on the performance indicators and the quality of those indicators, and methods and arrangements for 
performance evaluation, hence the current study focusing on the performance indicators. 
Traditionally, the evaluation system of performance contracting has been based on quantitative 
performance indicators (Nellis, 1988, 1989; Shirley, 1989) and later, some qualitative indicators introduced 
(Shirley & Xu, 1998, 2001; Trivedi, 2005). Review of the common version of performance contracting shows 
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that the performance evaluation system of India’s MOU entails four broad performance indicators: financial, 
productivity and cost reductions, technical dynamism and project implementations (Trivedi, 2005). Drawing on 
evidence from China, South Korea and other developing countries, Shirley and Xu (1998, 2001) established that 
profitability
1
 (i.e. return on assets) and productivity (i.e. labour and total factor) dominate the performance 
indicators in operation with the latter taking an average of two-thirds of the total weight assigned (see also 
Shirley, 1989). It is on the basis of these performance indicators that studies assessing the impact of performance 
contract on the performance of SOEs have been undertaken and mixed results reported (Larbi, 2001; Mallon, 
1994; Shirley & Xu, 1998, 2001; Simpson & Onumah, 2010). There are even those who assert that performance 
contracting have not succeeded in improving the performance of SOEs (see e.g. Shirley, 1996, 1998). This 
instigates further studies examining the nature and types of performance indicators used in the performance 
contracting systems of two countries who adopted the system at different time periods and under different 
circumstances: Ghana and Kenya.  
From the foregoing, it is clearly established that performance evaluation and perhaps performance 
management is an integral part of performance contracting. However recent studies suggest the need for 
integrated and interconnected framework to improving performance of public sector organizations via 
performance contracting (Chaturvedi & Gautam, 2013). This call resonates with established attributes of quality 
performance evaluation system and performance indicators in particular. For instance, performance indicators as 
per the most cited performance management framework, balanced scorecard (BSC), comprise four financial and 
non-financial performance management dimensions (see Table 1) which have causal relationship with each other: 
innovation and learning, internal business process, customer, and financial (Kaplan and Norton, 1996).   
Indeed, the foregoing performance indicators must be such that organisational learning will lead to 
growth measures of internal business process, followed by customer satisfaction and finally, the financial results 
(see also Kaplan & Norton, 1996; Nørreklit, 2000).  Other scholars emphasize the need for performance 
indicators to be interconnected and have causal relationship in providing a comprehensive performance 
management system for any settings (public and private sectors) (Chaturvedi & Gautam, 2013; Ferreira & Otley, 
2009; Fryer, et al, 2009; De Vries, 2010; Fryer, et al., 2008). These attributes are therefore relied upon in 
evaluating performance contracting as a performance evaluation tool. 
Table 1: Perspectives of Balance Scorecard 
Perspectives financial customers internal business 
process 
Innovation, 
learning and 
Growth 
Thematic 
Questions 
How does the firm 
look to 
shareholders? 
How do 
customers see 
the firm? 
What must the firm 
improve or excel 
at? 
How can the firm 
continue to 
improve & create 
value? 
Indicators profitability ratios customer 
satisfaction 
lead time for 
procurements 
productivity 
ratios 
 liquidity ratios market share Product 
development 
employee cost to 
revenue ratios 
 change in revenues 
growth 
waiting time 
between order 
and delivery 
labour cost control employee 
commitment 
 Change in expenses 
 
customer 
retention 
internal 
governance 
sales of new 
products and 
services 
 solvency ratios   No. of new 
products 
developed 
 
3.0 Research method  
This study adopts case study strategy in achieving the objectives of this study. Despite criticisms of the efficacy 
of case study strategy for generalization of findings, it is useful for theoretical, interpretative, hypothesis-
generating, theory confirming, supporting internal validity and providing causal insight and depth of field 
(Bennett 2004; Gerring 2007). Also, the strategy aids an in-depth investigation and understanding of the relevant 
contextual factors, provision of insight into grey and complex issues, issues of context-specific nature,  and 
tracing processes and patterns holistically over a period of time (George & Bennett 2004; Gerring 2007; Yin 
2003).  
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In this study, the case study strategy was applied in identifying the unit of analysis at different levels. At 
country level, two countries were chosen for the study, Ghana and Kenya. Moreover, the SOE sector was the 
focus in relation to performance contracting, and finally, the analysis was restricted to performance indicators in 
the performance contracting system.  
Moreover, this strategy allows triangulation of data collection method, sources of data and types of data; 
however, in this study, data collected are mainly from secondary sources. The study relied on multiple secondary 
data including policy documents on the implementation and management of performance contracting, 
government reports and publications, SOE performance evaluation reports, and sample performance contracts. 
These documentary evidences provided the background and objectives of performance contracting documents.  
   
4.0 Findings from the Cases Adopted 
4.1 The Ghanaian Case: Background to SOE sector and Performance Contracting 
The Ghanaian SOE sector predates her political independence from the British in 1957, but the sector began to 
grow after independence under the leadership of the first president, Dr. Kwame Nkrumah. This was evident by 
an increase in the number of SOEs from 4 to 53 within a decade (1957 to 1966), operating in the strategic 
aspects of the economy as monopolies and monopsonies (SEC, 1992, 1995). Performance of the sector was 
considered as impressive following the significant contribution it made to Ghana’s GDP (about 26%) and formal 
employment (86%) (SEC, 1992). 
However, the impressive performance could not be sustained due to problems – such as poor 
management of SOEs, political instability through militarily interventions, and failure of successive government 
to continue initiatives that seek to develop the sector by predecessor governments (SEC 1992, 1995). These 
challenges coupled with global economic crisis led to the SOEs becoming budgetary burdens draining about 
12% of total government expenditure, and causing budget deficit of over 3% of Ghana’s GDP (Adda, 1989; 
Tangri, 1991).  
Following from the foregoing, Ghana had to subscribe to the World Bank/IMF sponsored Economic 
Recovery programme (ERP) in 1983 (SEC, 1992, 1995). As part of this programme was the SOE reform 
programme of which performance contracting was introduced to the Ghanaian SOE sector to be managed by a 
rebirth State Enterprises Commission (SEC) under the State Enterprises Commission Law, 1987 (PNDCL 170).  
From the SEC reports cited above, the processes of implementing the performance contracting system 
began in 1988 but the first versions were piloted in 1989 by 11 core SOEs (e.g. SEC, 1992). The process was 
expanded to include other SOEs described at non-core, and following reported increases in the revenues and 
profitability of the SOEs, the number of participating SOEs began to rise, so as at 1992, there were 47 SOEs 
operating under the performance contract system in Ghana (SEC, 1995). As at end of 2010, the number 
participating SOEs has reduced to 34 (see Figure 1 for the pattern of participating SOEs in the performance 
contract system).  
 
Figure 1: Trend of SOE Participation in the PC System 
 
Source: Author’s Research 
4.1.1 Performance Dimensions for Evaluating Performance 
In Ghana, it is the responsibility of the State Enterprises Commission (SEC) to evaluate the performance of 
SOEs in addition to all the activities and processes associated with performance contracting. The performance 
evaluation is preceded by performance monitoring which takes the form of quarterly financial and operational 
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report from SOEs, and onsite visits for physical verification of capital projects set as targets.  
Actual performance evaluation is based on mutually agreed targets developed along both financial and 
non-financial performance indicators.  Content analysis of performance contracts and performance evaluation 
reports since inception show broad performance dimensions which had been in use until 1999 when a fourth 
dimension referred to as Dynamic effect was introduced (see Table 2). The inclusion of this fourth dimension 
can be traced to a recommendation by consultants engaged under the sponsorship of the World Bank in 1998 
(Boston Institute for Developing Economies (BIDE) report, 1998). This is to, among other things allow the 
evaluation of SOEs to take cognisance of their long term viability. 
Table 2: Performance Dimensions and Indicators for Evaluating SOEs 
1990 1999 2009 
Financial/Economic: 
Gross profit 
NPBT  
Staff cost/Sales 
Admn. cost/revenue 
Financial/Economic: 
Total revenue, operating income, net 
profit after tax (NPAT), return on 
assets, dividend declared, increased 
and efficient use of internally 
generated funds (for those PE that 
receive financial support from 
government) 
Financial/Economic: 
Total revenue, operating income, net 
profit after tax (NPAT), return on 
assets, dividend declared, increased and 
efficient use of internally generated 
funds (for those PE that receive 
financial support from government) 
Efficiency/productivity: 
Staff strength 
Output 
Running cost 
Accounts receivable 
Labour productivity  
Efficiency/productivity: 
Daily/weekly/ 
monthly outputs, staff strength, the 
ratio of administration expense and 
revenue, the ratio of staff cost and 
revenue 
Efficiency/productivity: 
Daily/weekly/ 
monthly outputs, staff strength, the ratio 
of administration expense and revenue, 
the ratio of staff cost and revenue 
Management 
improvement: 
Completion of accounts 
Completion of projects 
Training of staff  
Submission of corporate 
plans 
Submission of quarterly  
report 
Management improvement: 
Conformance to SEC quarterly 
reports format, timely submission of 
quarterly reports, annual audited 
accounts, draft budget and PC, 
approved board minutes, filled-out 
integrated PE database forms, 
fulfilment of dividend obligations, etc 
Management improvement: 
Conformance to SEC quarterly reports 
format, timely submission of quarterly 
reports, annual audited accounts, draft 
budget and PC, approved board 
minutes, filled-out integrated PE 
database forms, fulfilment of dividend 
obligations, etc 
 Dynamic effect: Staff Training 
(submission of budgeted and 
implementation of training 
programme); Corporate Planning 
(submission of updated corporate plan 
for at least 2 years); Maintenance 
(submission of maintenance 
programme and implementation 
schedule); Safety Management 
(submission of Safety Management 
Programme and implementation); 
Research and development; and 
marketing 
Dynamic effect: Staff Training 
(submission of budgeted and 
implementation of training programme); 
Corporate Planning (submission of 
updated corporate plan for at least 2 
years); Maintenance (submission of 
maintenance programme and 
implementation schedule); Safety 
Management (submission of Safety 
Management Programme and 
implementation); 
Research and development; and 
marketing 
Review of the performance indicators under each broad performance dimension reveals that there are 
few changes which appear to be an issue of reclassification. For instance, ratios of staff cost to revenue, and 
administrative expenses to revenue, which hitherto were classified under the Financial/economic indicators, 
presently falls under efficiency/productivity.  
Moreover, weights assigned to each dimensions have changed over the years. Historically, the 
Financial/ economic dimensions attracted 50%; Efficiency/productivity (35%); and Management improvements/ 
projects (15%).  Since 1999, the performance indicators and weights have changed to Financial/ economic 
(50%)
1
; Dynamic effect (30%) and Management improvements/ projects (20%).  
 
4.2 The Kenyan Case: Background to SOE sector and Performance Contracting 
Kenya is said to have inherited its SOEs from the British (Grosh, 1991) and like many countries in Africa, the 
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number of SOEs in Kenya began to increase after gaining independence in December 1963, in pursuit of the 
drive by leaders in the sub-region for African socialism (see also Nellis, 2005). Similarly, the contribution of 
SOEs to the Kenyan economy was short-lived, hence request for financial assistance from the World Bank in 
1980 (Grosh, 1991; Swamy, 1994). Citing World Bank reports on the Kenyan economy, Swamy (1994) for 
instance reported that, the public sector of Kenya was overly extended due to massive creation of public sector 
organization operating in the main stream civil service and as state corporations. He adds that those parastatals 
had directly and indirectly drained the state budget and the banking system.  
Despite accessing the World Bank structural adjustment loan, the Kenya government was passive in the 
implementing of the programs associated with the loan facility like other countries in Africa. In fact, Kenya is 
said to have been active only from the 1990s, hence, evidence of privatization and divestitures programs in that 
period as well as the restructuring of some notable state corporations (Government of Kenya, 2010). In fact, 
different reform strategies were implemented but performance of the public service did not improve, hence the 
Economic Recovery Strategy (ERS) Plan, where performance contracting system was introduced in 2003 as a 
management tool of public resources (Government of Kenya, 2010). 
Unlike most countries, the Kenyan performance contract system was locally inspired, drawing on best 
practices from across the globe. Moreover, it is considered the only system enjoying the most political support, 
and apparently one of few systems covering the entire public sector: government departments, state-owned 
enterprises, municipalities and tertiary institution (Trivedi, 2008). 
Starting with 16 Kenyan state corporations in 2004, impressive and unprecedented results influenced its 
extension to all state corporations, ministries, local government, and many more. As at 2010, the system have 
been implemented in 462 public institutions (see further detail in Table 4). Indeed, the profit before tax of the 
SOEs involved in the initial signing of performance contracting increased by over 282% in the 2004/2005 fiscal 
year. Similarly in the 2005/2006 year, dividend from SOEs went up to over 200% of what was budgeted (Trivedi, 
2008). In addition, there are reports of improved service delivery and culture of performance, increased 
accountability for results and transparency in the management of state results (Performance Contract Steering 
Committee Reports, 2007; Trivedi, 2008).  
Table 3: Pattern of Growth of Performance Contracting 
Year/ 
Type of Public 
institution 
State Corporation Ministries & 
dept. 
Local Authority Tertiary 
Institutions 
2003/2004 16 - - - 
2005/2006 116 35 5 - 
2006/2007 127 35 175 - 
2007/2008 130 38 175 - 
2008/2009 139 45 175 68 
4.2.1 Performance Dimensions for Evaluating Performance 
With regards to performance dimensions for evaluating performance, the Kenyan case is said to be one of the 
most comprehensive in the world (Trivedi, 2008). They cover five broad areas: financials/economic, service 
delivery, non-financial, operations, and dynamic/qualitative issues. Weights  assigned to each dimension 
depends on the type of public sector organization, but often, the dimension on service delivery receives the 
highest (see table 4 for details). 
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Table 4: Performance Evaluation Dimensions under the Kenya PC system 
 
Performance Dimensions Performance Indicators 
Financial/Economic (20%) Compliance to agreed budget levels 
Cost reductions/savings 
Profitability 
Dividend 
Efficiency in utilizing funds 
Service delivery (30%) Implementation of service delivery charter 
Customer satisfaction 
Non-financial (10%)  Compliance to corporate/strategic plans 
Ensuring ISO certification 
Management of idle assets 
Operations (25%) Policy and legal reviews on operations 
Information disclosure on products and services 
Research and development  
Project and program implementation 
Innovative goods and services 
Dynamic/Qualitative (15%) Organizational capacity (skills development via training and use of IT) 
Innovations in service delivery 
Employee satisfaction 
Safety measures 
Meeting statutory obligation 
Education on behavioral change (HIV/AIDS, etc) 
Reducing corruptions 
 
5.0 Discussions and Conclusion: Comparing Ghana and Kenya 
A comparison of the performance evaluation dimensions used in the performance contracts of the countries on 
this study shows some differences and similarities. Starting with the similarities, it can be seen from Tables 2 
and 4 that the performance dimensions, financials/economic and dynamic are common in both countries. 
Interestingly, both dimensions are positioned first and last respectively. Further, analysis of the performance 
indicators under the common categories shows some common performance indicators. For instance in both cases 
(see Tables 2 and 4), profitability, dividend, and efficient utilization of funds are the common indicators, and to 
some extent, the indicator on changes in revenue and expenses. Moreover, staff trainings and development, 
health and safety issues are the common performance indicators under the dynamic performance dimension.  
Focusing on the performance indicators generally, also, shows that there are some performance 
indicators used in both cases, but fall under different categorization of performance dimensions. For instance, 
performance indicators relating to corporate plans and management of idle assets fall under non-financials in the 
Kenyan case, but they can be identified under the dynamic effect in the case of Ghana. Furthermore, the 
indicators relating to research and development, project planning and implementations found under the operation 
performance dimension can be traced to the dynamic effect in the case of Ghana. In addition, the performance 
indicator relating to submissions and compliance to budget which falls under the financial dimension in Kenya 
rather falls under management improvement in the case of Ghana 
Despite the foregoing similarities, there are a few notable differences identified in both cases. First, 
there are differences in weights assigned to each performance dimensions in both cases. Whilst in the case of 
Ghana, the financial/ economic dimension is allocated the highest weight, service delivery is key in the case of 
SOEs in Kenya. Secondly, there is neither a performance dimension nor performance indicator under the 
Ghanaian performance contracting system evaluating SOEs based on customer satisfaction. The third noticeable 
difference is the performance dimension on management improvement.  
Also, in the Kenyan case, the submission of audited annual reports, quarterly reports and draft budgets 
and performance contract are mandatory in the performance contracting system, but these documentations are 
not used in the evaluation of SOEs as in the Ghanaian case. In fact, timely submission of these documents are 
critical in the evaluation of SOEs in Ghana, hence are given the appropriate score based on the agreed target.  
Furthermore, the demand for information about the activities of the boards of SOEs in the case of Ghana (board 
minutes) suggest evaluating the governance practices, which is apparently absent in the Kenyan case. 
Relating the above to the BSC framework and other best practices shows some notable strengths and 
weaknesses so far as the practices of the two countries are concerned (see Table 5). In both countries, there are 
evidences of the use of performance indicators which fall under three out of the four main performance 
dimensions under the BSC framework- the financial and internal business process, and innovation, learning and 
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growth perspectives.   
A few items - that are classified under the various indicators such as research and development for both 
countries can be traced to BSC’s internal business process even though they have been classified differently 
under dynamic effect and operations for Ghana and Kenya respectively. This is also similar to BSC’s indicator 
of labour cost control which is represented differently under efficiency and productivity for the Ghanaian case 
and under financial/economic for the Kenyan case. 
Internal governance on the other hand, as represented in BSC appears to be absent. The only instance 
where there is evidence of internal governance is in the area of submission of approved board minutes, dividend 
obligations, annual audited accounts and other compliance issues.  
Table 5: Comparison of Performance Dimensions vis-à-vis BSC 
Dimension Kenya   Ghana BSC dimension represented 
Financial/Economic present present Financial 
Efficiency/productivity absent present internal business process/ innovation, learning & growth 
Management improvement absent present internal business process 
Ghana: timely submission of reports (annual and quarterly), audited accounts, board minutes, etc.  
Operations present absent internal  business process/ innovation, learning & growth 
Service delivery present absent Customers 
Kenya: customer service charter in the form of customer satisfaction, service delivery charter 
Non-financial present absent internal business process 
Dynamic Effect present present internal business process/ innovation, learning & growth 
With regard to innovation, learning and growth, the indicator that dominates the two cases is number 
of new products developed under the BSC.  Kenya, for instance, represented this indicator by innovations in 
service delivery, and research and development, whereas Ghana’s case was represented by only research and 
development. Sale of new products and services was also only represented in the Kenyan case as reflected in the 
BSC but not in the Ghanaian case. This was also the same for productivity ratios (as in the BSC) which was 
classified under efficiency/productivity in the Ghanaian case, and under operations in the Kenyan case. In all, 
under the innovation, learning and growth perspective, employee commitment was not well represented in both 
cases. 
Overall, the Ghanaian case seems to show significant weakness in relation to customer satisfaction.  
Studies confirm that whilst learning and growth drives the internal business processes of an organisation, 
customer satisfaction drives the foregoing, and the end results are improved financial performance (Kaplan & 
Norton, 1996; Nørreklit, 2000).   
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